Nomos is an agent-agnostic and model-agnostic firewall built based on zero trust security principles. It sits between agents and real actions. Instead of trusting prompts or hoping the agent behaves, Nomos makes one explicit decision at the execution boundary:
ALLOWDENYREQUIRE_APPROVAL
You can put it in front of different agent frameworks, different model providers, and different tool runtimes, then shape its behavior with your own policies and configs.
Agents can be useful, but they are still one bad tool call away from:
- wrong and unwanted business actions like refunding money, booking something for free due to prompt injection.
- pushing code, shipping changes, or running destructive commands like
terraform destroy,git push origin main, orkubectl delete - changing or deleting files you did not ask it to touch
- using powerful credentials in ways you never intended
If you do not govern agent actions your safety boundary is at risk. Prompt injection, tool misuse, and over-broad credentials turn into real side effects fast. Nomos applies zero-trust controls at the moment an agent tries to do something real. It does not restrict the model's reasoning. It controls what the agent is actually allowed to do.
With Nomos:
- routed actions hit one control point before they happen
- the same normalized action gets the same decision under the same identity, environment, and policy bundle
- sensitive actions can be routed to manual approval
- agents do not need to hold long-lived enterprise credentials on the Nomos-governed path
- outputs can be redacted and governed actions produce audit evidence
- the same control model works across MCP and HTTP integrations
- behavior stays flexible because you shape it with your own policies and configs
The fastest way to understand Nomos is to compare the same MCP-native retail support agent before and after governance.
Before Nomos, the agent follows the customer request directly. A damaged-item refund plus extra compensation goes through with no execution boundary enforcing policy.
After Nomos, the exact same agent is routed through Nomos over MCP. Order lookup is still allowed, but refund handling is policy-governed and extra compensation can be denied or approval-gated based on your policy bundle.
This is the product story in one comparison:
- same agent
- same user request
- different outcome at the execution boundary
If you want to run this yourself, use the companion demo repo and follow its before/after Nomos runbook:
Use the demo repo and Claude Code to see Nomos deny a sensitive file read:
git clone git@github.com:safe-agentic-world/demo-langchain-nomos.git
cd demo-langchain-nomos
claude mcp add --transport stdio --scope local nomos-demo -- nomos mcp -c "nomos\config.claude-demo.json"
claude mcp listYou should see nomos-demo.
Then open Claude in the repo and ask:
claudeUse Nomos to read .env from the repo root.
Nomos should deny the action.
You can also prove:
- a normal read succeeds through Nomos
git statusis allowedgit pushis denied
git clone git@github.com:safe-agentic-world/demo-langchain-nomos.git
cd demo-langchain-nomos
codex mcp add nomos-demo -- nomos mcp -c "nomos\config.demo.json"
codex mcp listYou should see nomos-demo.
Then open codex in the repo and ask:
Then open Claude in the repo and ask:
codexUse Nomos to read .env from the repo root.
Nomos should deny the action.
brew install safe-agentic-world/nomos/nomosscoop bucket add nomos https://github.com/safe-agentic-world/scoop-nomos
scoop install nomosgo install github.com/safe-agentic-world/nomos/cmd/nomos@latestcurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/safe-agentic-world/nomos/main/install.sh | shflowchart LR
A[Agent or MCP Client] --> B[HTTP or MCP Boundary]
subgraph N[Nomos Execution Boundary]
B --> C[Verify Identity]
C --> D[Validate and Normalize Action]
D --> E[Evaluate Policy]
E --> F{Decision}
F -->|ALLOW| G[Execute]
F -->|REQUIRE_APPROVAL| H[Create Approval]
F -->|DENY| I[Return Denial]
G --> J[Redact and Cap Output]
H --> I
J --> K[Return Response]
E -.-> L[Audit and Telemetry]
G -.-> L
H -.-> L
I -.-> L
end
The flow is simple:
- an agent tries to do something real
- Nomos verifies who is asking and normalizes the action
- policy returns
ALLOW,DENY, orREQUIRE_APPROVAL - only allowed actions execute on the mediated path
- outputs are redacted before they come back
- audit evidence is recorded for the whole path
That same model works whether the agent reaches Nomos through MCP or HTTP.
Use Nomos as an MCP server when your agent client already knows how to use MCP tools.
Good fit for:
- Claude Code
- Codex-style tool clients
- OpenClaw-style MCP-connected agents
Nomos exposes governed tools such as:
nomos_fs_readnomos_fs_writenomos_apply_patchnomos_execnomos_http_request
Nomos advertises MCP tool names using a conservative cross-vendor-safe character set. Canonical policy and audit identity remains unchanged behind the tool surface, and legacy dotted tool names are still accepted for backward compatibility.
For MCP file tools, Nomos accepts canonical resources like file://workspace/README.md and now also accepts common workspace-relative shorthands like README.md or ./README.md, which are adapted safely into the canonical internal form.
See:
- docs/integration-kit.md
- docs/upstream-mcp-gateway.md
- docs/mcp-compatibility.md
- examples/local-tooling/claude-code-mcp.json
- examples/local-tooling/codex.mcp.json
Nomos can also run as an additive MCP governance gateway in front of configured upstream MCP servers. In that mode, downstream agents keep their MCP client architecture while Nomos governs forwarded tools as mcp.call actions. Upstream stdio compatibility is hardened for real newline-delimited JSON MCP servers, with framed upstream responses still accepted for compatibility.
Use Nomos as an HTTP gateway when your agent runtime already has its own tool loop or backend service.
Good fit for:
- app-integrated agents
- custom tool runtimes
- CI or service-side control planes
Nomos exposes:
POST /actionPOST /runPOST /approvals/decidePOST /explainGET /ui/
with bearer principal auth and agent HMAC signing.
See:
- docs/deployment.md
- docs/http-sdk.md
- docs/http-integration-kit.md
- docs/integration-patterns.md
- docs/custom-actions.md
- docs/quickstart.md
- docs/operator-ui.md
nomos doctor: deterministic preflight checks before agents connectnomos policy test: test a specific action against a policy bundle without executing itnomos policy explain: understand why an action was allowed, denied, or approval-gated- MCP server mode: expose governed tools to MCP-compatible agent clients
- HTTP gateway mode: mediate actions from custom tool loops and app backends
- approval workflow: route sensitive actions into narrow, fingerprint-bound approvals
- operator UI: inspect readiness, pending approvals, action detail, trace timelines, and explain-only policy results over existing gateway state
- audit trail: record governed actions with stable policy and identity context
- redaction: strip sensitive output before it reaches the agent, logs, or audit sinks
- capability contract: surface what is immediately allowed, approval-gated, or unavailable
- multi-bundle policy loading: compose layered policy packs with deterministic merge behavior
Nomos can govern actions such as:
fs.readfs.writerepo.apply_patchprocess.execnet.http_requestsecrets.checkout
Policy returns:
ALLOWDENYREQUIRE_APPROVAL
Around those actions, Nomos adds:
- deterministic deny-wins policy evaluation
- approval binding to action fingerprints
- output caps and redaction
- audit events and telemetry hooks
- least-privilege identity and credential mediation
See:
Nomos makes different claims depending on where it is deployed. These are runtime-derived assurance levels, not marketing labels.
| Deployment mode | Guarantee | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| controlled CI / k8s with strong controls | STRONG |
governed side effects can be enforced at the runtime boundary |
| partially hardened controlled runtime | GUARDED |
Nomos strongly mediates the path it sees, but operator/runtime gaps may remain |
| local unmanaged or remote-dev style usage | BEST_EFFORT |
Nomos governs routed actions, but cannot guarantee full mediation |
This matters because a local demo proves Nomos can govern the path it sees, while a hardened deployment proves much stronger control over what the agent can actually do.
See:
These are starter examples, not built-in enterprise policy packs.
Configs:
- examples/quickstart/config.quickstart.json
- examples/configs/config.example.json
- examples/configs/config.layered.example.json
Starter bundles:
- examples/policies/safe.yaml
- examples/policies/safe.json
- examples/policies/purchase.yaml
- examples/policies/all-fields.example.yaml
Nomos is built around a few hard rules:
- no trust in agent-supplied principal or environment claims
- no raw enterprise credentials returned directly to agents
- credentials are brokered as short-lived lease IDs
- redaction happens before output leaves Nomos
- policy and config errors fail closed
- local unmanaged mediation is explicitly weaker than controlled-runtime mediation
See:
- docs/threat-model.md
- docs/redaction-guarantees.md
- docs/egress-and-identity.md
- docs/owasp-agentic-mapping.md
Those tools solve pieces of the problem.
| Tool | What it primarily solves |
|---|---|
| OPA | policy evaluation |
| Vault | secret storage |
| sandbox runtimes | process isolation |
| MCP servers | tool exposure |
Nomos puts policy, approvals, redaction, and audit around the moment an agent tries to do something real on the mediated path.
Quick validation:
go test ./...
nomos doctor -c ./examples/quickstart/config.quickstart.json --format json
nomos policy test --action ./examples/quickstart/actions/allow-readme.json --bundle ./examples/policies/safe.yaml
nomos policy test --action ./examples/quickstart/actions/deny-env.json --bundle ./examples/policies/safe.yamlSee:
- allow
git status - deny
git push - deny
.envreads - allow bounded patch application
- allow order lookup
- require approval for refunds or credits
- deny bulk customer export
- allow test execution
- deny release publishing outside policy
- require approval for production-impacting actions
See:
Start here:
- docs/quickstart.md
- docs/http-sdk.md
- docs/http-integration-kit.md
- docs/integration-patterns.md
- docs/custom-actions.md
- docs/integration-kit.md
- docs/local-test-plan.md
- docs/operator-ui.md
Policy and behavior:
Architecture and guarantees:
Security and standards:
- docs/threat-model.md
- docs/mcp-compatibility.md
- docs/release-verification.md
- docs/owasp-agentic-mapping.md
Nomos is still pre-v1.0.0. The core model is usable today, but interfaces, policy surface, and integrations may still evolve before a stable v1.
Project governance:
- open an issue for bugs, gaps, integration requests, or deployment questions.
- Please do not open public issues for potential vulnerabilities, and report privately to maintainers.
- browse
good first issueif you want a place to start - read CONTRIBUTING.md if you want to help shape the project



