🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Command Injection

[raccioly]

🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Command Injection (RCE) via execSync string interpolation in VS Code extension
🎯 Impact: Using user-controlled strings (such as the workspaceDir path) in execSync allows arbitrary shell command execution if the path contains shell metacharacters.
🔧 Fix: Refactored execSpecguard and its call sites to pass argument arrays natively to execFileSync, avoiding internal string parsing and shell evaluation. Added .cmd fallbacks and Windows shell: true execution options specifically.
✅ Verification: npm test passes and vscode-extension/extension.js is verified.

---

PR created automatically by Jules for task 1944622172690719633 started by @raccioly

[google-labs-jules]

👋 Jules, reporting for duty! I'm here to lend a hand with this pull request.

When you start a review, I'll add a 👀 emoji to each comment to let you know I've read it. I'll focus on feedback directed at me and will do my best to stay out of conversations between you and other bots or reviewers to keep the noise down.

I'll push a commit with your requested changes shortly after. Please note there might be a delay between these steps, but rest assured I'm on the job!

For more direct control, you can switch me to Reactive Mode. When this mode is on, I will only act on comments where you specifically mention me with @jules. You can find this option in the Pull Request section of your global Jules UI settings. You can always switch back!

New to Jules? Learn more at jules.google/docs.

---

For security, I will only act on instructions from the user who triggered this task.