ci: harden trusted publish workflow#148
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rschristian
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May 19, 2026
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Summary
Why
Trusted publishing/OIDC workflows should not restore shared dependency caches, and tag-based action references can be retargeted after compromise. The StepSecurity advisory for
actions-cool/issues-helperis the concrete failure mode: tags were moved to an imposter commit, while full-SHA pinned workflows were unaffected.Verification
actions/setup-nodewithoutpackage-manager-cache: falseand foractions/cacheusage.uses:entries and confirmed all external actions are pinned to 40-character commit SHAs.