Validate user on Streamable HTTP session DELETE#1604
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GET and POST already verify that the authenticated user matches the user who initiated the session via HasSameUserId. DELETE skipped that check, so anyone holding a session ID could tear down someone else's session. Mirror the same check on DELETE as a defense-in-depth DoS mitigation. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Matches how the other third-party actions in this repo are pinned, so a compromised upstream tag pointer can't redirect coverage runs to a different commit. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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HandleDeleteRequestAsynccurrently tears down a session for anyone who sends DELETE with the rightMcp-Session-Id. GET and POST already verify the authenticated user matches the user who initiated the session viaHasSameUserId, so DELETE was the odd one out.Mirror the same check on DELETE so a session ID alone isn't enough to kill someone else's session — defense-in-depth against a stolen/leaked session ID being used to DoS the original owner.
Added a focused test that:
Second commit is unrelated cleanup: SHA-pinning the
danielpalme/ReportGenerator-GitHub-Actionreference inci-code-coverage.ymlto match how every other third-party action in the repo is pinned.