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Add insecure postMessage example in index1.html#25

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Add insecure postMessage example in index1.html#25
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@maekuss maekuss commented May 22, 2026

This HTML file demonstrates an insecure postMessage implementation that lacks origin validation, allowing potential cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.

This HTML file demonstrates an insecure postMessage implementation that lacks origin validation, allowing potential cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.
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hacktron-app Bot commented May 22, 2026

⏭️ Hacktron Security Check — Skipped

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1 issue found across 1 file

Severity Count
🔴 High 1

View full scan results

Comment thread index1.html
Comment on lines +1 to +67
<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=edge" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
<title>Insecure postMessage without Origin Validation (VULNERABLE)</title>
<style>
body { font-family: ui-sans-serif, system-ui, -apple-system, Segoe UI, Roboto, Helvetica, Arial; margin: 2rem; line-height: 1.5; }
.card { border: 1px solid #e5e7eb; border-radius: 14px; padding: 1rem 1.25rem; box-shadow: 0 1px 4px rgba(0,0,0,0.06); }
code, pre { background: #f8fafc; border: 1px solid #e5e7eb; border-radius: 8px; padding: .25rem .5rem; }
pre { padding: .75rem 1rem; overflow: auto; }
.danger { color: #b91c1c; font-weight: 700; }
#output { min-height: 48px; border: 1px dashed #e5e7eb; border-radius: 10px; padding: .75rem; background: #ffffff; }
</style>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Insecure <code>postMessage</code> without Origin Validation <span class="danger">(VULNERABLE)</span></h1>
<p>This page intentionally demonstrates an insecure <code>message</code> event listener that <strong>does not validate <code>event.origin</code></strong> and blindly injects received content into the DOM.</p>

<div class="card" style="margin: 1rem 0;">
<p><strong>Status</strong></p>
<p id="origin">Last message origin: <em>(none)</em></p>
<div id="output">No message yet.</div>
</div>

<script>
// VULNERABLE IMPLEMENTATION — DO NOT USE IN PRODUCTION
// This listener accepts messages from ANY origin and injects the data into the DOM without sanitization.
window.addEventListener('message', (event) => {
// Shows the origin but FAILS to validate it (critical bug)
document.getElementById('origin').textContent = 'Last message origin: ' + event.origin;

// Dangerous sink: direct innerHTML assignment of untrusted data
const incoming = typeof event.data === 'string' ? event.data : JSON.stringify(event.data);
document.getElementById('output').innerHTML = incoming;
});
</script>

<hr />
<h2>How to reproduce the issue</h2>
<ol>
<li>Open <em>this</em> file in your browser (served via any origin).</li>
<li>In the browser console, open a different-origin tab (e.g., <code>example.com</code>):
<pre>window.open('https://example.com', 'attacker');</pre>
</li>
<li>Switch to the console of the newly opened tab and run:
<pre>window.opener.postMessage('&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(\'Injected via \n\' + location.origin + \n\' — NO ORIGIN CHECK!\')&gt;', '*');</pre>
You should see an alert on the vulnerable page and the DOM content updated.
</li>
</ol>

<!--
SECURE PATTERN (for reference only — intentionally not active):

window.addEventListener('message', (event) => {
const allowed = new Set(['https://trusted.example']);
if (!allowed.has(event.origin)) return; // Validate origin strictly

// Optionally, validate event.source as well and use structured, expected message shapes
// if (event.data && event.data.type === 'expected') { ... }

// Avoid dangerous sinks like innerHTML; prefer textContent or safe rendering
});
-->
</body>
</html>
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🔴 High: Origin Validation Bypass and DOM XSS via postMessage

The application implements a window.addEventListener('message', ...) listener that processes messages from any origin without validating the event.origin property. This allows any malicious website to send arbitrary messages to the application. Furthermore, the application directly assigns the event.data to the innerHTML property of a DOM element, leading to a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability. This bypasses the browser's Same-Origin Policy (SOP) boundary, which is intended to protect the application from untrusted cross-origin interactions.

Steps to Reproduce
  1. Open index1.html in a browser.
  2. Open a separate tab in the same browser (e.g., example.com).
  3. In the console of the second tab, run: window.opener.postMessage('<img src=x onerror=alert("XSS")>', '*');
  4. Observe the alert on the vulnerable page.
# No python script required, this is a browser-based vulnerability.
# No bash script required, this is a browser-based vulnerability.
# To trigger:
# 1. Open index1.html in a browser.
# 2. In the console of another tab, execute:
# window.opener.postMessage('<img src=x onerror=alert("XSS")>', '*');
N/A

PoC Url: N/A

Fix with AI

Open in Cursor Open in Claude

Fix the following security vulnerability found by Hacktron.

File: index1.html
Lines: 1-67
Severity: high

Vulnerability: Origin Validation Bypass and DOM XSS via postMessage

Description:
The application implements a window.addEventListener('message', ...) listener that processes messages from any origin without validating the event.origin property. This allows any malicious website to send arbitrary messages to the application. Furthermore, the application directly assigns the event.data to the innerHTML property of a DOM element, leading to a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability. This bypasses the browser's Same-Origin Policy (SOP) boundary, which is intended to protect the application from untrusted cross-origin interactions.

Proof of Concept:
**Steps to Reproduce**

1. Open index1.html in a browser.
2. Open a separate tab in the same browser (e.g., example.com).
3. In the console of the second tab, run: window.opener.postMessage('<img src=x onerror=alert("XSS")>', '*');
4. Observe the alert on the vulnerable page.

```python
# No python script required, this is a browser-based vulnerability.
```

```bash
# No bash script required, this is a browser-based vulnerability.
# To trigger:
# 1. Open index1.html in a browser.
# 2. In the console of another tab, execute:
# window.opener.postMessage('<img src=x onerror=alert("XSS")>', '*');
```

```bash
N/A
```


PoC Url: N/A

Affected Code:
    window.addEventListener('message', (event) => {
      // Shows the origin but FAILS to validate it (critical bug)
      document.getElementById('origin').textContent = 'Last message origin: ' + event.origin;

      // Dangerous sink: direct innerHTML assignment of untrusted data
      const incoming = typeof event.data === 'string' ? event.data : JSON.stringify(event.data);
      document.getElementById('output').innerHTML = incoming;
    });

Fix this vulnerability. Only change what's necessary - don't modify unrelated code.

Triage: Reply !fp <reason> (false positive), !valid (confirmed), or !accepted_risk <reason>. Reason is optional but improves future scans — e.g. !fp internal endpoint, not user-facing. Any other reply is saved as a triage note.

View finding in Hacktron

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