Serve .html, .svg and .xhtml as text/plain in browse file handler#103
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These file types were served with executable content types (text/html, image/svg+xml) allowing stored XSS via package archive contents. Also adds Content-Security-Policy: sandbox and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff headers to all browse file responses.
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These file types were served with executable content types (
text/html,image/svg+xml) allowing stored XSS via package archive contents. A single GET to a cached artifact's.htmlor.svgfile would execute attacker-controlled scripts on the proxy origin.Changes:
.html,.htm,.xhtml,.svgtotext/plainindetectContentTypeContent-Security-Policy: sandboxandX-Content-Type-Options: nosniffheaders to allbrowseFileresponses