If you believe you have found a security vulnerability in DCP — the protocol, the Python Bridge, the CLI, or the reference firmware — please report it privately.

Do not open a public GitHub issue.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: github.com/device-context-protocol/dcp/security/advisories/new

We will acknowledge receipt within 72 hours and aim to ship a fix or a public advisory within 30 days. If the issue is in a dependency, we will coordinate with upstream.

In scope:

• Authentication, capability scoping, or token verification bypass.
• Memory safety issues in the firmware (buffer overruns, CBOR parser, COBS decoder).
• Wire-format parsing crashes or panics on malformed input.
• Bridge bugs that let an LLM cause a side effect outside its granted capabilities.

Out of scope:

• Attacks that require physical access to a paired device.
• Denial of service via the underlying transport (we rely on the transport's own guarantees).
• Misuse via a legitimately granted capability — that's the deployer's policy to set, not DCP's.

• Treat the Bridge as a privileged process. Run it under a service account with minimum filesystem access.
• Store HMAC secrets in your OS keychain or a secret manager, not in plain files or env vars baked into shell history.
• Set short TTLs on capability tokens (the v0.2 default of 3600 s is a ceiling, not a target — minutes are better when the workload allows).
• If the bus is shared (RS-485 multi-drop, public MQTT broker), terminate TLS / link-layer encryption at the Bridge.