docs: Report critical Denial of Service vulnerability in docker manager#176
docs: Report critical Denial of Service vulnerability in docker manager#176Vaiditya2207 wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThis pull request updates security vulnerability documentation by replacing an arbitrary file write vulnerability with a denial of service scenario involving missing container execution timeouts. A new vulnerability entry is also tracked in the sentinel file. Changes
Estimated code review effort🎯 2 (Simple) | ⏱️ ~12 minutes Poem
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 3✅ Passed checks (3 passed)
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📝 Coding Plan
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Inline comments:
In `@SECURITY_ISSUE.md`:
- Around line 26-50: The timeout wrapper around docker.wait_container currently
stops the container but does not remove it, risking resource leaks; update the
timeout branch to call the same cleanup flow used elsewhere by invoking
self.cleanup_container(&id).await (which internally uses remove_container with
force: true) instead of just self.docker.stop_container(&id, None).await, and
ensure the function returns an appropriate error after cleanup; reference the
symbols docker.wait_container, timeout (tokio::time::timeout),
self.cleanup_container, self.docker.stop_container, and remove_container to
locate and apply the change.
- Around line 52-54: The OWASP link in the References block is broken; update
the URL in SECURITY_ISSUE.md that currently reads
"https://owasp.org/API-Security/editions/2023/en/0x11-t04-unrestricted-resource-consumption/"
to a valid OWASP API Security page (for example replace it with
"https://owasp.org/www-project-api-security/") so the References section points
to a working OWASP documentation URL while leaving the Tokio link unchanged.
ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration
Configuration used: defaults
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
Run ID: dbd27f73-6f55-40d7-9c84-5426af5707b5
📒 Files selected for processing (2)
.jules/sentinel.mdSECURITY_ISSUE.md
| ✅ Recommended Remediation | ||
| Implement strict path sanitization for the `filename` extracted from the multipart request before using it with `PathBuf::join`. | ||
| 1. Reject any filename containing path separators (`/` or `\`). | ||
| 2. Alternatively, extract only the final file component using `std::path::Path::new(&filename).file_name()`. | ||
| 3. Ensure the resolved path remains within the intended storage directory bounds. | ||
| Implement a strict timeout wrapper around the `wait_container` call using `tokio::time::timeout`. If the container does not exit within the allowed time (e.g., 10 seconds), forcefully kill and remove the container to free up resources and return an error to the user. | ||
|
|
||
| Example fix: | ||
| ```rust | ||
| let safe_filename = std::path::Path::new(&filename) | ||
| .file_name() | ||
| .and_then(|name| name.to_str()) | ||
| .ok_or((StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "Invalid filename".to_string()))?; | ||
|
|
||
| let file_path = version_dir.join(safe_filename); | ||
| use tokio::time::{timeout, Duration}; | ||
|
|
||
| let wait_future = self.docker.wait_container::<String>(&id, None).next(); | ||
| let timeout_duration = Duration::from_secs(10); // 10 second timeout | ||
|
|
||
| match timeout(timeout_duration, wait_future).await { | ||
| Ok(Some(Ok(res))) => { | ||
| tracing::debug!("[Job {}] Container exited with code {}", job_id, res.status_code); | ||
| } | ||
| Ok(_) => { | ||
| tracing::warn!("[Job {}] Wait failed or container crashed", job_id); | ||
| } | ||
| Err(_) => { | ||
| tracing::warn!("[Job {}] Execution timed out after {} seconds", job_id, timeout_duration.as_secs()); | ||
| // Force kill the container | ||
| let _ = self.docker.stop_container(&id, None).await; | ||
| return Err("Execution timed out".to_string()); | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| ``` |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Incomplete resource cleanup in the proposed fix.
The example fix correctly implements the timeout wrapper, but line 46 only calls stop_container without removing the container. This creates a potential resource leak.
Looking at the existing cleanup pattern in syscore/src/docker/manager.rs:282, the code calls self.cleanup_container(&id).await which uses remove_container with force: true (see syscore/src/docker/manager.rs:48-53). This both stops and removes the container.
The timeout handler should maintain the same cleanup behavior to prevent container accumulation.
🛠️ Proposed fix to ensure complete cleanup
Err(_) => {
tracing::warn!("[Job {}] Execution timed out after {} seconds", job_id, timeout_duration.as_secs());
- // Force kill the container
- let _ = self.docker.stop_container(&id, None).await;
+ // Force kill and remove the container
+ let _ = self.cleanup_container(&id).await;
return Err("Execution timed out".to_string());
}This ensures the container is both stopped and removed, preventing resource leaks and maintaining consistency with the existing cleanup pattern.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| ✅ Recommended Remediation | |
| Implement strict path sanitization for the `filename` extracted from the multipart request before using it with `PathBuf::join`. | |
| 1. Reject any filename containing path separators (`/` or `\`). | |
| 2. Alternatively, extract only the final file component using `std::path::Path::new(&filename).file_name()`. | |
| 3. Ensure the resolved path remains within the intended storage directory bounds. | |
| Implement a strict timeout wrapper around the `wait_container` call using `tokio::time::timeout`. If the container does not exit within the allowed time (e.g., 10 seconds), forcefully kill and remove the container to free up resources and return an error to the user. | |
| Example fix: | |
| ```rust | |
| let safe_filename = std::path::Path::new(&filename) | |
| .file_name() | |
| .and_then(|name| name.to_str()) | |
| .ok_or((StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "Invalid filename".to_string()))?; | |
| let file_path = version_dir.join(safe_filename); | |
| use tokio::time::{timeout, Duration}; | |
| let wait_future = self.docker.wait_container::<String>(&id, None).next(); | |
| let timeout_duration = Duration::from_secs(10); // 10 second timeout | |
| match timeout(timeout_duration, wait_future).await { | |
| Ok(Some(Ok(res))) => { | |
| tracing::debug!("[Job {}] Container exited with code {}", job_id, res.status_code); | |
| } | |
| Ok(_) => { | |
| tracing::warn!("[Job {}] Wait failed or container crashed", job_id); | |
| } | |
| Err(_) => { | |
| tracing::warn!("[Job {}] Execution timed out after {} seconds", job_id, timeout_duration.as_secs()); | |
| // Force kill the container | |
| let _ = self.docker.stop_container(&id, None).await; | |
| return Err("Execution timed out".to_string()); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ``` | |
| use tokio::time::{timeout, Duration}; | |
| let wait_future = self.docker.wait_container::<String>(&id, None).next(); | |
| let timeout_duration = Duration::from_secs(10); // 10 second timeout | |
| match timeout(timeout_duration, wait_future).await { | |
| Ok(Some(Ok(res))) => { | |
| tracing::debug!("[Job {}] Container exited with code {}", job_id, res.status_code); | |
| } | |
| Ok(_) => { | |
| tracing::warn!("[Job {}] Wait failed or container crashed", job_id); | |
| } | |
| Err(_) => { | |
| tracing::warn!("[Job {}] Execution timed out after {} seconds", job_id, timeout_duration.as_secs()); | |
| // Force kill and remove the container | |
| let _ = self.cleanup_container(&id).await; | |
| return Err("Execution timed out".to_string()); | |
| } | |
| } |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@SECURITY_ISSUE.md` around lines 26 - 50, The timeout wrapper around
docker.wait_container currently stops the container but does not remove it,
risking resource leaks; update the timeout branch to call the same cleanup flow
used elsewhere by invoking self.cleanup_container(&id).await (which internally
uses remove_container with force: true) instead of just
self.docker.stop_container(&id, None).await, and ensure the function returns an
appropriate error after cleanup; reference the symbols docker.wait_container,
timeout (tokio::time::timeout), self.cleanup_container,
self.docker.stop_container, and remove_container to locate and apply the change.
| 🔗 References | ||
| - Rust `PathBuf::join` documentation: https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/path/struct.PathBuf.html#method.join | ||
| - OWASP Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Write: https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal | ||
| - Tokio Timeout Documentation: https://docs.rs/tokio/latest/tokio/time/fn.timeout.html | ||
| - OWASP Unrestricted Resource Consumption: https://owasp.org/API-Security/editions/2023/en/0x11-t04-unrestricted-resource-consumption/ |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🧩 Analysis chain
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify that the referenced documentation URLs are accessible
echo "Checking Tokio timeout documentation..."
tokio_status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://docs.rs/tokio/latest/tokio/time/fn.timeout.html")
echo "Tokio docs HTTP status: $tokio_status"
echo "Checking OWASP resource consumption documentation..."
owasp_status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://owasp.org/API-Security/editions/2023/en/0x11-t04-unrestricted-resource-consumption/")
echo "OWASP docs HTTP status: $owasp_status"
if [ "$tokio_status" = "200" ] && [ "$owasp_status" = "200" ]; then
echo "✓ All documentation URLs are accessible"
exit 0
else
echo "✗ One or more URLs returned non-200 status"
exit 1
fiRepository: Vaiditya2207/OKernel
Length of output: 255
Fix broken OWASP documentation reference.
The OWASP URL (https://owasp.org/API-Security/editions/2023/en/0x11-t04-unrestricted-resource-consumption/) returns HTTP 404. The Tokio documentation link is valid. Update the OWASP reference to point to the correct documentation URL.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@SECURITY_ISSUE.md` around lines 52 - 54, The OWASP link in the References
block is broken; update the URL in SECURITY_ISSUE.md that currently reads
"https://owasp.org/API-Security/editions/2023/en/0x11-t04-unrestricted-resource-consumption/"
to a valid OWASP API Security page (for example replace it with
"https://owasp.org/www-project-api-security/") so the References section points
to a working OWASP documentation URL while leaving the Tokio link unchanged.
1 participant
SECURITY_ISSUE.mdto report a new critical vulnerability: a DoS attack vector via missing execution timeout insyscore/src/docker/manager.rs..jules/sentinel.mdjournal.PR created automatically by Jules for task 5672647519740711715 started by @Vaiditya2207
Summary by CodeRabbit