fix(security): add base64 validation for GitHub token (#3079)#3085
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fix(security): add base64 validation for GitHub token (#3079)#3085
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…terpolation The base64-encoded GitHub token in offerGithubAuth() was passed to shellQuote() without the same base64 character validation applied to other base64 values elsewhere in the file (wrapperB64, unitB64, timerB64). While shellQuote() already provides adequate protection, this adds the same defense-in-depth guard for consistency. Fixes #3079 Agent: security-auditor Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Why: Defense-in-depth gap — the base64-encoded GitHub token was the only base64 value in agent-setup.ts not validated before shell interpolation.
Summary
offerGithubAuth()base64-encodes the GitHub token and passes it throughshellQuote()for use in a remote SSH command. WhileshellQuote()(POSIX single-quote escaping + null byte rejection) already provides adequate protection, every other base64 value in the same file (wrapperB64,unitB64,timerB64) includes an explicit/^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$/validation guard before use. This PR adds the same guard totokenB64for consistency.Assessment of the broader issue
After auditing all code paths mentioned in #3079:
shellQuote()uses correct POSIX single-quote escaping ('\''technique) with null byte rejection — robust against injectionsanitizeTermValue()uses a strict allowlist for TERM values — stronger than quotingvalidateRemotePath()uses character allowlist + traversal checks — safe for its use caseshellQuote()-wrappedorchestrate.ts/spawn-skill.tsalready had validationThe only gap was
tokenB64inofferGithubAuth()which is now fixed.Fixes #3079
-- refactor/security-auditor