fix: #33 checkup credential scan now covers all agent workspace directori…

skills/agentguard/SKILL.md

@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ Detect tampered or unregistered skill packages by comparing file hashes against
 Scan workspace files for leaked secrets using AgentGuard's own detection patterns.
 
 **Steps**:
-1. Use Grep to scan `$OC/workspace/` (especially `memory/` and `logs/`) with patterns from:
+1. Use Grep to scan `$OC/workspace/` **recursively, covering all agent subdirectories** (e.g. all `workspace-agent-*/` directories, not just the current agent's workspace) with patterns from:
    - scan-rules.md Rule 7 (PRIVATE_KEY_PATTERN): `0x[a-fA-F0-9]{64}` in quotes
    - scan-rules.md Rule 8 (MNEMONIC_PATTERN): BIP-39 word sequences, `seed_phrase`, `mnemonic`
    - scan-rules.md Rule 5 (READ_SSH_KEYS): SSH key file references in workspace
@@ -616,10 +616,14 @@ Run these checks in parallel where possible. These are **universal agent securit
 
 1. **[REQUIRED] Discover & scan installed skills** (→ feeds Dimension 1: Code Safety): Glob `~/.claude/skills/*/SKILL.md` and `~/.openclaw/skills/*/SKILL.md`. For each discovered skill, **run `/agentguard scan <skill_path>`** using the scan subcommand logic (24 detection rules). Collect the scan results (risk level, findings count, risk tags) for each skill.
 2. **[REQUIRED] Credential file permissions** (→ feeds Dimension 2: Credential Safety): `stat -f '%Lp' <path> 2>/dev/null || stat -c '%a' <path> 2>/dev/null` on `~/.ssh/`, `~/.gnupg/`, and if OpenClaw: on `$OC/openclaw.json`, `$OC/devices/paired.json`
-3. **[REQUIRED] Sensitive credential scan / DLP** (→ feeds Dimension 2: Credential Safety): Use Grep to scan workspace memory/logs directories for leaked secrets:
-   - Private keys: `0x[a-fA-F0-9]{64}`, `-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY-----`
-   - Mnemonics: sequences of 12+ BIP-39 words, `seed_phrase`, `mnemonic`
-   - API keys/tokens: `AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}`, `gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36}`, plaintext passwords
+3. **[REQUIRED] Sensitive credential scan / DLP** (→ feeds Dimension 2: Credential Safety): Use Grep to scan **all** agent workspace directories for leaked secrets. This MUST cover the entire workspace root, not just the current agent's directory:
+   - For OpenClaw / QClaw: scan `~/.openclaw/workspace/` and `~/.qclaw/workspace/` recursively — this includes **all** `workspace-agent-*/` subdirectories, not just the current agent's workspace
+   - For Claude Code: scan `~/.claude/` recursively
+   - Patterns to detect:
+     - Private keys: `0x[a-fA-F0-9]{64}`, `-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY-----`
+     - Mnemonics: sequences of 12+ BIP-39 words, `seed_phrase`, `mnemonic`
+     - API keys/tokens: `AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}`, `gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36}`, plaintext passwords
+   - **Important**: Use the workspace *root* directory as the scan target (e.g. `~/.qclaw/workspace/`), not a specific agent subdirectory. All sibling `workspace-agent-*` directories must be included.
 4. **[REQUIRED] Network exposure** (→ feeds Dimension 3: Network & System): Run `lsof -i -P -n 2>/dev/null | grep LISTEN` or `ss -tlnp 2>/dev/null` to check for dangerous open ports (Redis 6379, Docker API 2375, MySQL 3306, MongoDB 27017 on 0.0.0.0)
 5. **[REQUIRED] Scheduled tasks audit** (→ feeds Dimension 3: Network & System): Check `crontab -l 2>/dev/null` for suspicious entries containing `curl|bash`, `wget|sh`, or accessing `~/.ssh/`
 6. **[REQUIRED] Environment variable exposure** (→ feeds Dimension 3: Network & System): Run `env` and check for sensitive variable names (`PRIVATE_KEY`, `MNEMONIC`, `SECRET`, `PASSWORD`) — detect presence only, mask values