fix(sec): harden remaining workflow shell injection points and urllib guard#171
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Move all remaining ${{ github.* }} and ${{ needs.*.outputs.* }} context
expressions out of run: blocks into env: in release.yml, ci.yml, and
thank-you-sync.yml. Addresses the injection pattern found by independent
code review on PR #170 (closes #168 follow-on gaps).
Also adds a PyPI name regex guard in supply_chain_risk.py to reject
package names that do not conform to PEP 508, future-proofing the
urllib call before this script is promoted to CI (closes #169).
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Summary
Follow-on from #170. Independent code review of the shell injection fix identified three additional workflow files carrying the same
${{ github.* }}/${{ needs.*.outputs.* }}interpolation-in-run pattern, plus a urllib input validation gap inscripts/supply_chain_risk.py.Closes #168 (remaining gaps identified by independent review).
Closes #169 (urllib file:// vector hardened before script enters CI).
Changes
Workflow hardening (shell injection — same pattern as PR #170)
release.ymlcontents: write+packages: writepermissionsthank-you-sync.ymlci.ymlAll
${{ ... }}expressions moved toenv:blocks;run:scripts reference${ENV_VAR}only.scripts/supply_chain_risk.py— PyPI name validation guardAdded
_PYPI_NAME_RE(PEP 508 package name regex) that rejects anypackage_namenot matching^[A-Za-z0-9]([A-Za-z0-9._-]*[A-Za-z0-9])?$before theurllib.request.urlopencall. This eliminates any theoretical path-traversal or scheme-injection vector if this script is ever wired into CI with an untrusted SBOM as input.Type
Testing
supply_chain_risk.pychange is a pure guard — returns{}for invalid names, same as the existing error path; no behaviour change for valid PyPI namesChecklist
Downstream impact
bankstatements_core