Problem or use case
Multi-agent architectures are becoming standard. Cisco DefenseClaw introduced A2A scanning that validates inter-agent communication channels are authenticated and that no unauthorized agent can inject instructions into a trusted agent's workflow.
As agents use MCP, A2A protocol, and custom tool-based delegation, the communication surface between agents becomes an attack vector for instruction injection and privilege escalation.
Proposed solution
Add an a2a scanner module that checks:
- Agent delegation configs for authentication requirements
- Inter-agent communication channels for encryption (TLS)
- Tool schemas that accept arbitrary text from other agents (injection surface)
- Permission boundaries between agents (can agent B access agent A's tools?)
- Circular delegation patterns (agent loops)
This is a new scanner module alongside installation, skill, mcp, and credential.
Area
New scanner module
Problem or use case
Multi-agent architectures are becoming standard. Cisco DefenseClaw introduced A2A scanning that validates inter-agent communication channels are authenticated and that no unauthorized agent can inject instructions into a trusted agent's workflow.
As agents use MCP, A2A protocol, and custom tool-based delegation, the communication surface between agents becomes an attack vector for instruction injection and privilege escalation.
Proposed solution
Add an
a2ascanner module that checks:This is a new scanner module alongside installation, skill, mcp, and credential.
Area
New scanner module